Cybersecurity · Invoice fraud
When a supplier’s mailbox is hacked, the fake invoice arrives in a real thread from a real address. Your filters can’t catch it. A phone call on a known number can.
Real mailbox, real thread, wrong bank
Email security checks all pass
Verify changes on a known number
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Your accounts payable person gets an email from a supplier you have paid for years. It comes from their real address, it sits in the same thread as last month’s invoice, it has the right invoice number and the right amount, and it says the supplier has moved banks, so please use the new details attached. The tone is right. The signature is right. Even the timing is right, because the payment really is due on Friday.
Nothing about it is fake except the bank account. That is vendor email compromise: a criminal has broken into your supplier’s mailbox (or occasionally your own), read the conversations for a while, and stepped in at exactly the point where money is about to move. It is one of the most expensive forms of business email compromise, which as a whole accounted for 24,768 complaints and just over $3 billion in reported losses in the FBI’s 2025 IC3 annual report.
To be honest, you can do everything right on your own side (strong passwords, MFA, good email filtering, staff training) and still pay a criminal. Unless your payment process assumes that email lies, the attack works.
Most phishing gives itself away somewhere: a misspelled domain, an odd link, a generic greeting, an unusual request. Vendor email compromise usually has none of those, for a simple reason. The attacker has had access to the real mailbox and has been reading it, sometimes for weeks. They know who you deal with, how your contact writes, what the invoices look like and when you pay. They often set up mail rules on the hijacked account so that your replies go to a hidden folder, and the real supplier never sees the conversation.
It also defeats the technical checks. Email authentication (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) exists to prove that a message really came from the domain it claims. In this attack, it did. Every check passes, because the message was sent from the supplier’s own system. Your filter is being asked “is this genuinely from your supplier?” and the honest answer is yes.
There is a variant where the criminal, having read the thread, registers a lookalike domain (an “rn” in place of an “m”, or a dropped letter) and continues the conversation from there. That one can be spotted by a sharp eye. The first can’t, not from the email alone.
We saw a lookalike case at a midsize consulting firm. Finance received an email that appeared to come from a regular supplier, asking for a new bank account for the next payment. It used the supplier’s display name and quoted a real invoice number, but the reply-to domain differed from the real one by a single character. What caught it was an accounts payable clerk, who thought the request had arrived unusually close to payment day and escalated it. We checked the headers and the supplier’s known contact details, then called the supplier on the phone number already in the firm’s vendor master (its own supplier records), not the number in the email. The supplier confirmed nothing had changed. We quarantined the message, searched the firm’s other mailboxes for similar mail, and reviewed whether any account had been compromised. Then we reinforced the one rule that matters: a change to bank details is verified outside email and approved by a second person, however convincing the message looks.
This is general information and not legal advice; if it has happened to you, talk to an attorney and your insurer promptly. With that said, the answer is often less comforting than people expect.
Your instinct says the supplier was hacked, so it is their problem. Courts don’t necessarily agree. In US disputes between a payer and a hacked vendor, courts have often asked which party was in the best position to prevent the fraud, an approach associated with the Sixth Circuit’s 2018 decision in Beau Townsend Ford Lincoln v. Don Hinds Ford, which treated each side’s care as a question of fact for trial. (I am relying on law-firm summaries of these cases here, such as Foley Hoag’s and Moore & Van Allen’s, not my own reading of the judgments.) They look at things like whether there were red flags, whether the payer followed its own verification procedures, and how well the vendor secured its email. Outcomes vary: some courts have put the whole loss on one side, others have suggested splitting it, and, according to those summaries, a payer who skipped verification has more than once ended up still owing the original invoice. In other words, you may pay twice.
Insurance is not a sure thing either. Cover for this kind of loss usually sits in a social engineering or funds transfer fraud section of a cyber or crime policy, often with a lower limit than the rest of the policy and conditions about verification. Our article on why cyber insurance claims get denied covers the common reasons, and one of them is “you didn’t call to verify”.
The control that saved that firm is boring and procedural. Give your finance team something like this:
Worked example. Take, as an illustration, a business that pays one key supplier about $40,000 a month. The callback costs perhaps five minutes a few times a year, when a supplier genuinely changes banks. Without it, one successful fraud takes $40,000, and if a court later decides the payer was best placed to prevent it, the business still owes the supplier the original $40,000. Five minutes against $80,000 is not a difficult trade.
Wondering how your payment process and email setup would hold up? Our free Technology Health Assessment is about 30 minutes of data collection, then a plain-language report the next day covering cybersecurity, IT operations, business continuity and more, with next steps in order. It is yours to keep and there is no obligation. Book your assessment.
The first call is to your bank, to ask for the payment to be recalled. The second job is a complaint at ic3.gov with the full transaction details. The FBI’s Recovery Asset Team works with banks to freeze funds, and in 2025 it reported a 58 percent success rate across roughly 3,900 incidents. Hours matter here; days usually mean the money has moved on.
Then call the supplier, on a known number, and tell them their email is compromised. They may not know. Ask your IT provider to check your own mailboxes too, in case the attacker came in on your side rather than theirs; our guide to what to do if your email is hacked covers the steps. Finally, notify your insurer, because most policies have short reporting deadlines.
You can’t secure your suppliers’ mailboxes, but you can stop yours being the one that gets used against your customers. MFA on every mailbox, alerts on new forwarding and inbox rules, DMARC on your domain and a review of who can send invoices are the core of it, and our guide to business email compromise prevention walks through each. We set these up as part of our cybersecurity work. Be that as it may, the callback rule is the piece that saves the money. Everything else only reduces the odds.
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It is a form of business email compromise where a criminal takes over a supplier’s real mailbox, reads the conversations, and sends a genuine-looking invoice or a request to change bank details so your payment goes to their account.
Because the message really did come from the supplier’s own email system, so the authentication checks pass and there is no malicious link or attachment to flag. That is why the defense has to be a verification step in your payment process.
Possibly. US courts have often asked which party was in the best position to prevent the fraud, and a payer that skipped verification may still owe the original invoice. This is general information; ask your attorney about your situation.
No. It only proves money reaches the account, and the criminal controls that account and will confirm receipt. Verify by phone on a number from your own records instead.