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Cybersecurity · Payroll fraud

No bank detail change should ever be approved by email alone

Payroll diversion is a two-line email asking HR to update someone’s direct deposit. It works because it looks ordinary. A written callback rule stops it.

It’s a short, polite email

Spam filters see nothing wrong

Call back on a known number

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How it arrives

The email is short and perfectly polite. “Hi, I’ve switched banks and need to update my direct deposit before the next payroll. What do you need from me?” It appears to come from a real employee, often someone senior enough that HR would rather not make them wait, and it arrives a few days before payroll closes. HR replies with the form, the “employee” fills it in, and the next paycheck goes to an account the criminal controls (according to the FBI, often a prepaid card account). The real employee finds out on payday, when nothing arrives.

That is payroll diversion fraud. It is a form of business email compromise, and the fix that works is a rule: no change to anyone’s bank details is approved on the strength of an email, ever. The change is confirmed with the person on a phone number or in a system you already had before the request arrived.

Why it gets past the spam filter

Spam filters are good at catching things that look like attacks: malicious attachments, suspicious links, known bad senders, messages sent to thousands of people at once. Payroll diversion emails have none of those. There is no link and no attachment. The message goes to one person, it is grammatically fine, and it asks for something HR does every month. To a filter, it is indistinguishable from an ordinary note from a colleague.

There are two common variants, and the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has warned about both: the spoofed-email version in a public warning on September 10, 2019, and the account-takeover version a year earlier, in September 2018. In the first, the email comes from a lookalike address or a free webmail account with the employee’s name as the display name, and HR doesn’t look closely at the actual address (on a phone, you often can’t see it at all). In the second, the criminal has phished the employee’s own login, goes into the payroll or HR self-service portal directly, changes the bank details, and sets up email rules so the employee never sees the “your direct deposit was changed” notification. The second one is nastier, because no human at HR is involved at all.

In the 2019 warning, the IC3 said losses from direct deposit change requests rose more than 815 percent between January 2018 and June 2019. The broader category has not slowed down since: in its 2025 report, IC3 recorded 24,768 business email compromise complaints with reported losses of just over $3 billion.

Why I say policy, not tool

It is tempting to buy your way out of this one, and better email security does help with the account-takeover variant. But the lookalike variant is a perfectly well-formed email asking a reasonable question. No tool can know that the real Maria did not change banks. Only Maria can.

So the defense has to be a step in the process that does not rely on the email being honest. It is the cheapest control I know of for this kind of fraud, and the one I would put in place first. It costs a two-minute phone call per request, and most small businesses get only a handful of genuine bank changes a year.

The verification rule, step by step

This is roughly what I would hand a client’s HR or payroll person, written up as a one-page policy and signed off by the owner so that nobody feels awkward enforcing it.

  1. Bank changes are accepted only through the payroll system’s self-service portal, protected by multi-factor authentication, or on a signed form handed over in person. Requests by email, text or chat are answered with “please use the portal” and nothing else.
  2. Every change, however it arrives, is confirmed by calling the employee on the phone number already in the HR file. Not a number in the email, not a number in the signature block. If the employee is in the building, walk over.
  3. Payroll sends a notice of the change to the employee by two channels, for example their work email and a text to the number on file, so a hijacked mailbox can’t hide it.
  4. A change requested within a few days of payroll takes effect the following cycle, unless it has been confirmed by phone. Criminals rely on “before Friday”.
  5. Any request that comes with pressure (“I’m traveling, can’t take calls, just do it”) is treated as suspicious by default. Real employees understand a callback.
  6. The owner and executives follow the same rule. Senior people are impersonated most, precisely because staff hesitate to question them.

Then back the policy with a few technical basics: multi-factor authentication on email and on the payroll portal for everyone, alerts when someone creates a mail forwarding or deletion rule, and a short training session for HR and payroll staff on exactly this scam. Our guide to business email compromise prevention covers the wider set of controls, and MFA for small business covers the rollout.

Not sure your payroll and email setup would catch this? Our free Technology Health Assessment takes about 30 minutes of data collection, and the next day you get a plain-language report on your cybersecurity, IT operations, business continuity and more, with a short list of next steps in order. It is yours to keep, no obligation. Book your assessment.

If it has already happened

Speed matters more than anything else. Call your bank and your payroll provider immediately and ask for a recall of the payment. Then file a complaint at ic3.gov with the full transaction details, whatever the amount. The IC3’s Recovery Asset Team works with banks to freeze stolen funds; in 2025 it reported freezing about $679 million across roughly 3,900 incidents, a success rate of 58 percent. Those odds drop quickly as the days pass.

After that, reset the employee’s password and check their mailbox for forwarding and deletion rules, in case this was the account-takeover version. Your cybersecurity provider or IT person should be able to do that within the hour. Whether the business must pay the employee again, and who ultimately bears the loss, depends on your state’s wage laws and your insurance policy; that is a question for your attorney and your insurer, not for me.

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Questions we hear

What is payroll diversion fraud?

A criminal pretends to be an employee, usually by email, and asks HR or payroll to change their direct deposit details. The next paycheck goes to the criminal’s account. Sometimes they log in to the employee’s payroll portal and make the change themselves.

How can HR tell a fake direct deposit request from a real one?

Often it can’t, just from the email. That is why the answer is a callback to the phone number already on file before any change takes effect. Look at the actual sender address too, but don’t rely on it.

Will cyber insurance cover a diverted paycheck?

It depends on the policy. Social engineering and funds transfer fraud cover is often a separate, limited part of a cyber or crime policy. Read yours, or ask your broker, before you need it.

Does the payroll company take responsibility?

Usually not if the change was requested through your own staff or your employee’s real login. Check your payroll provider’s terms and the security settings they offer, such as change notifications and MFA.

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